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Abstract 
 
In The Structure of Appearance Nelson Goodman aims at describing the world as 
composed of individuals. He builds his system on phenomenal qualities or qualia. We 
propose a mathematical model for the qualia based on a dynamical system, the so-
called “Discrete Cat Mapping”. 
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 In The Structure of Appearance1, Nelson Goodman pose, expose and compose the core 
of his thought2. Hereafter we intend, for the most part, to establish a link between the 
basic units or qualia of Goodman’s system and the chaotic mapping called Arnold Cat 
Map3. Sections I and II are dedicated to put forward an overview of Goodman’s opus 
that points out the traits relevant for our purpose. Section III treats the Discrete Cat Map 
and Section IV deals, properly, with the proposed interpretation. In these pages we take, 
in general, the liberty of repeating the chosen passages of Goodman’s works without 
quotation marks. As a bonus, this procedure allows us to avoid awkward paraphrases. 
 
 
I. Nominalism 
 
Nominalism describes the world as composed of individuals. To explain nominalism we 
need to explain not what individuals are but rather what constitutes describing the world 
as composed of them. So to describe the world is to describe it as made up of entities no 
two of which break down into exactly the same entities. Nominalism does not involve 
excluding abstract entities but requires only that whatever is admitted as an entity at all 
be construe as an individual4. 
 
Goodman’s  nominalism “is a positions that [ … ] renounces classes and other non-
individuals. The position that also accepts non-individuals he calls “Platonism” ”5. 
 
Let us suppose, for example, that a nominalist and a Platonist start with the same 
minimal, atomic elements for their systems. The nominalist admits also all wholes or 
individuals sums comprised of these, and so has a universe of a finite number of 
entities. The Platonist admits no sums of atoms but admits all classes of them, and he 
further admits all classes of classes of atoms, and so on ad infinitum. He gets all these 
extra entities out of his original atoms. Goodman’s dictum is “No distinction of entities 
without distinction of content”. 
 
 
 II. Qualia 
A. Definitions and Determinations 
 
To say that a thing looks green is to make a statement concerning a presented quality, a 
color quality of some presentation of the thing, while to say that a thing is  green is to 
make a more complex statement concerning the color qualities exhibited by various 
presentations of the thing. The color names are thus used in two different ways in 
ordinary language: in the one case for presented characters, hereafter called qualia; in 
the other, for properties of things6. 
 
Though presentations are momentary and unrecallable, they are nevertheless 
comparable in that they contain repeatable and recognizable qualia. Any judgment  that 
a quale of one presentation is the same as a quale of another is open to pertinent 
criticism that may cause it to be abandoned. If we divide the stream of experience into 
its smallest concrete parts and then go on to divide these concreta into sense qualia, we 
arrive at entities suitable as atoms for a realistic system. A visual concretum might be 
divided, for example, into three constituent parts: a time, a visual-field place, and a 
color7. 
 
A visual concretum is already a spatially smallest discernible particle of phenomena and 
the further analysis into its three component qualia leaves its space undivided. This 
analysis consists simply of distinguishing the place from both the time and color that 
together with the place, make up the concretum. 
 
Acceptance of qualia as individuals is not inconsistent with the refusal to countenance 
classes and other nonindividuals. Nominalism excludes all except individuals but does 
not decide what individuals are. To treat qualia as atoms for a system as not to suppose 
that they are the units in which experience is originally given. Even should it be shown 
that certain units of experience are in some sense apprehended prior to any operation of 
analysis or synthesis, this would not at all preclude the selection of other units as atoms, 
for a constructional system is not necessarily intended as an epistemological history. 
 
Location in the visual field may change when physical position is constant, or remain 
constant when physical position changes. A grammatical convention requires us to say 
of a color h and a place k that h occurs at k and not that k occurs at h; but this can be 
construed as a condensed way of saying that the two occur together8. By saying that two 
qualia are together, we intend to make an assertion having the same nontemporal 
character as a mathematical statement: a color is as at a place if the color was, is now or 
will be at that place and a color occurs at a time even though the time be past or future. 
Thus such expressions is “occurs at” or “is together with”, like “intersects” in 
mathematics, are to be taken as without effective tense9. 
 
 
B. Topology 
 
The specific qualia that an individual contains fix its size and shape with respect to each 
category of qualia. If we can count and are familiar with the order of qualia in a given 
category, then we can determine the size and shape of an individual x in that respect if 
we know exactly what qualia of that kind are contained in x. 
 
For the arrangement of a given set of qualia is not variable. Qualia cannot be “moved 
around”; each has –we might almost say each is– a fixed position in the array of the 
category to which it belongs. Terms for color, place, time, etc., may be called initial 
quality terms, while terms for shape and size are called derivative quality terms. Initial 
quality terms are construed as names of individuals while derivative quality terms are 
construed as syncategorematic. The central problem is to construct, for each category of 
qualia, a map that will assign to each qualia in the category a unique position and that 
will represent relative likeness of qualia by relative nearness in position10. 
 
We never actually compare more than two or three very similar qualia at any moment. 
Any adequate map of a category must thus be constructed on the basis of comparison 
made at many different times. Identifications of qualia from one moment to another are 
in a sense decrees but are made and corrected with a view to the difficulties than result 
from an ill-considered set of decrees. Identifications of physical objects and 
identification of qualia must of be co-ordinated with one another. The actual process of 
mapping is affected by practical limitations. We begin with observations of what we 
hope may prove to be a typical set of very similar qualia, seek to determine the pattern 
exhibited, and then by interpolation, extrapolation, and conjecture construct a tentative 
complete map that may later be improved and corrected11. 
 
A familiar “kind” or “category” of qualia consists of all colors, or all places, or all 
sounds, etc. When we compare two concreta with respect, say, to position or color, we 
are comparing a quale x that is part of one concretum with a quale y that is a part of the 
other and that belongs to the same category as x. Given any two qualia belonging to the 
same category, we can trace a path from one to the other by a series of steps, each to a 
quale matching the preceding one. When two qualia belong to different categories there 
is no such path joining them. We cannot go from a color to a time by such a series of 
steps. This suggests a way of defining categories: two qualia are joined by a path-called 
an M-path-just in case the ancestral of “M” applies between them. An individual is a 
clan if it cannot be divided into two parts such that no quale in one matches any quale 
in the other. A single quale constitutes such a clan, as does the sum of any group of 
qualia that match each other, the sum of two non-matching qualia and a third that 
matches both, and so on. A clan contains an M-path between each two of its quale parts. 
 
A quale-category is a most comprehensive clan. A category contains every quale that 
matches any part of it. A clan that fails of being a category lacks one or more qualia of 
the category containing the clan. Any sense realm such as that of the visual qualities or 
that of the auditory qualities, is defined as a sum of certain categories. A realm as a 
general term may be defined by enumeration of the several realms. The sum of all the 
qualia that match a given quale is called a manor. Every quale is a part of its own 
manor and of the manor of any matching quale. As an illustration let us consider the 
positive natural numbers and the following “rule”: the quale designated by any number 
matches the qualia designated by numbers not more than 4 places removed from that 
number (we define this a linear M-span of n=4): 
(i) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 … 
(ii) Manor of 1 = 1 + 2 + 3 +4 + 5 
Manor of 2 = 1 + 2 + 3 +4 + 5 + 6 
Manor of 3 = 1 + 2 + 3 +4 + 5 + 6 + 7 
Note that the rule is arbitrary to some degree for we do not have before us a fully 
articulated presystematic order against which the details of our constructed order can be 
checked. 
 
The rule is no part of system. It is an extrasystematic statement of a relationship 
between matching and order. The calculus is designed to apply to finite sets of 
elements. This fact explains why some of the most familiar theorems concerning order 
in the continuum, such that there is an element between each two distinct elements, do 
not hold here. At the same time, the calculus must be adequate for dealing with arrays of 
any degree of complication. We can by no means take it for granted that all categories 
of qualia are linear arrays12. 
 
 
C. Time 
 
Phenomenal time is merely one among the general categories of qualia. Every quale 
that is not itself a time occurs at some time; hence every concretum, no matter of what 
sense realm, contains a time. Consider a colored patch that appears in the visual field 
and stays for a while. The total presentation comprises the colors, places and times 
involved. It is temporally as well as spatially divisible; and its identity over different 
times, like its identity over different places, is the identity of a totality of diverse parts. 
In contrast, the sum of color-spots that constitutes the colored patch itself contains no 
times. Neither it nor any of its parts is temporally divisible. It retains its strict numerical 
identity throughout the period in question. Such occurrence through a period is quite a 
different matter from the duration of a thing or event; and we had better to observe the 
distinction by saying that the patch persists through the period. Under these definitions, 
an individual that endures or persists through a period endures or persists through every 
part of that period. The endurance or persistence is continuous or discontinuous 
according as the period is. Thus although a color quale occurs at times and persists 
through periods, it is nevertheless literally out of time. It is eternal. That is not to say 
that it is everpersisting, for nothing occurs at all times. Nor is an eternal individual 
everlasting; for an everlasting or ever-enduring individual is one that contains all times. 
Observe that the eternity of an individual is no bar to its occurrence at some times or its 
failure to occur at others. Only what is eternal is with a time13. 
III. The Discret Arnold Cat Mapping 
 
Arnold and Avez develop a study of the classical systems with strongly stochastic 
properties, the so-called C-systems. As an example they consider a continuous two-
dimensional invertible chaos map14. When the variables x,y belong to [0,1,…, N-1] the 
map is discretized. Through this exposition the mathematical details are reduced to the 
bare minimum consistent with clarity15. 
 
Let (x,y) denote a point in the unit square. The mapping takes (x,y) to the new point 
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The mapping preserves area16. The computer is a convenient device for demonstrating 
mappings where the screen serves as a two-dimensional lattice of points (pixels). 
Consider a square lattice of points and denote the points by (x,y). Their discretized 
values with the operations of addition and multiplication performed (mod N), may be 
expressed by the mapping 
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N is selected so as to make ample use of the capability of the screen. Starting with the 
initial configuration (a cat’s image, for instance), “snapshots” of the images at different 
times under the mapping are currently given in the literature17. By placing a picture of a 
cat in the unit square and then displaying several subsequent images resulting from the 
discrete flow, a mixing property appear: the images show that the cat tends to become 
“smeared” over the unit square18. The initial configuration must eventually return, since 
there are 2N×N possible configurations of the N×N pixels (each pixel is “on” or “off”). 
How long does it take an N dimension picture to return to its original image? Dyson and 
Falk show19 that the periodicity mN of the mapping has an upper bound m* which may 
be evaluated in a rather direct manner: 
(i) Consider a positive integer N>1 and write N in terms of its prime factors p and q: 
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Where p/N means “p divides N”. 
(ii) The upper bound m* results from the formula: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]εγβα 23,5102,12,1*2 111 −−− +−= qqppLCMm  
where ( );1,1−= δε M  LCM means “compute the least common multiple”. 
Remark that each factor of N written in terms of its factors has a 
corresponding term in the LCM. 
Example: N = 300 = 22·3·52 
  52 → 2(10)5 = 100 
  3(2ε) → 3·2 = 6 (ε= Max(2-1,1)=1) 
  Thus 2m* = LCM (100,6) = 600 and m* = 300. 
 
The upper bound of the period is 300. It must be noted that:  
(a) The period of the Discrete Cat Map does not always become greater with an 
increasing modulo (i.e., for N = 300 and N = 150, m* has the same value)20. 
(b) The number 2N×X is large and it is surprising to see that the configuration returns 
after only 24 iterations for N = 161 or after 15 iterations for N = 124. In general, 
the relationship between the size of the image and how many iterations it takes 
to return to its original form appears to be random. 
 IV. Towards a possible interpretation 
 
In this section we intend to establish a relation between some aspects of Goodman’s 
system and the Discrete Cat Map. As a proviso, we propose the following table of 
equivalences: 
 
quale, qualia pixel, pixels 
Two-dimensional 
concretum 
Configuration 
on the screen 
Map 
Arnold discrete 
map 
 
The problem is to construct, for each category of qualia, a map that will assign to each 
quale in the category a unique position and that will represent likeness of qualia by 
relative nearness in position. Topology and time determine the boundaries of the 
problem and some of their features may be treated in terms of the discrete map model. 
Let us focus on some of them: 
(1) Every quale-pixel occupies a point that pertains to the configuration of the N×N 
qualia-pixels. 
• Identifications of configurations and identifications of qualia must be 
coordinate with one another. The discrete map defines such a coordination. 
• Every adequate map of a concretum must be constructed on the basis of 
comparison made at many different times. The discrete map determines the 
evolution of each quale-pixel. 
(2) The image –of a cat, for a change– tends to become “smeared” on the N×N 
plane, i.e., on the screen. Hence a quale’s position varies at random between two 
period-stances. At any time a quale is “somewhere” on the screen. According to 
Goodman’s conception qualia cannot be “moved around”. Each quale has a 
fixed positition in the array of the category to which it belongs. We seem to 
indulge in a gross approximation when indicating a quale’s position by means of 
the adverb “somewhere”. But this term points to a mathematical fact which 
results from the discrete mapping we are dealing with. Moreover Goodman also 
indicates that identifications of qualia from one moment to another are, in a 
sense, decrees. 
(3) Godman’s calculus is designed to apply to finite sets of elements and it must be 
adequate for dealing with arrays of any degree of complication. In a discrete 
map, for an image of any degree of complexity the number N of qualia-pixels is 
finite. 
(4) “The assertion “two qualia are together” has the same nontemporal character as 
a mathematical statement”. In the discrete map model, after m* iterations, the 
same image reappears on the screen and the qualia relative positions –in the 
initial and final states– are the same, i.e., they are constant. What happens during 
these states? In (2) we have outlined a plausible answer to such a question. 
(5) “Phenomenal time is merely one among the general categories of qualia”. But 
on the screen the successive configurations themselves (“snapshots”) do not 
display time-qualia, although time pertains, properly, to the discrete map 
definition. At his point, a subtle conceptual turn is sharply unveiled by 
Goodman: “Every quale that is not itself a time occurs at some time”. A 
remarkable property of the model corresponds, in our opinion, to Goodman’s 
statement: the period of the mapping depends on the number N of qualia-pixels. 
Hence, in a way, every quale is related to some time. 
(6) “The colored patch contains no times. It retains its strict numerical identity 
through periods, it is out of time”. Iterations, periods and qualia numerical 
identity conform structural traits of the map model. Moreover the map is a 
mathematical conception and, by its very nature, “is out of time”. So, for 
instance, a color-quale is at a place if it was, is now or will be at that place and 
occurs at a time even though the time be past or future. 
(7) The sum of qualia that match a given quale –such is Goodman’s definition of a 
“manor”– is no part of the system. It is an extrasystematic statement between 
matching and order. The discrete mapping takes the point (x,y) to (x’,y’) by 
restricting the variables to the set [0,1, … N-1]. 
Suppose that this set of integers arranged according to their natural increasing 
values fixes a system, and let us introduce two equivalences: (a) between this set 
and Goodman’s system, and (b) between the extrasystematic rule and the 
discrete mapping. 
 
We remark that the resulting order of the qualia-pixels neither represents nor is an 
intrinsic structure of a given set of integers. Hence, the rule is arbitrary for there is no 
presystematic order against which the constructed order can be checked. 
 
Our choice of these seven illustrations of the proposed relationship is, somewhat, 
arbitrary and by no means exhaustive. Moreover each one of them is open to a critical 
analysis. Nevertheless at least this list of “simple samples” clarifies the intuition which 
sustains this work. 
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
In order to close the article two appreciations of Goodman appear to be pertinent: 
• “The actual process of mapping is naturally affected by practical limitations […] 
we seldom if ever have the opportunity of starting from a comprehensive set of 
observations […]. Rather we begin with observations of what we hope may 
prove  to be a typical set of very similar qualia, seek to determine the pattern 
exhibited, and then by interpolation, extrapolation, and conjecture construct a 
tentative map that may later be improved and corrected”21.  
• “What I have offered here constitutes only the beginning of a theory of nonlinear 
order. The best hope for further progress seems to me to lie in finding ways of 
making greater use of algebraic techniques”22. 
 
Although the analogy displayed through these pages may suffer a number of short 
comings, it conforms to a main project: to improve the map employing algebraic 
techniques. 
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